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STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION; H. J. CORLEISSEN, Chairman, LA Y T 0 N
MAXFIELD and LORENZO .T.
BOTT, members of the State Road
Commission,
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Case No. 8544

vs.

BRACK HOWARD NOBLE and ANN
C. NOBLE, his wife; ELMO ENGLAND; E. J. HUBER; and PACIFIC NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE
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PETITION FOR REHEARJNG
To the Honorable Supreme Court of the State of rtah:
The above case was reversed hy your Honorable
body upon the ground of absence of evidence to support
the verdict for two general reasons:
That the expert witnesses who testified for defendants fixed the value of the property by finding the
product of the total tons of sand and gravel times the
price per ton; and
1.

2. That compensation for the property was fixed
upon the basis of the equivalent of the total profits which
would be realized from future operations of the property,
instead of upon its actual present value in place.
\Ve respectfully submit that the above propositions
are not factually correct as shown by the record. We
further submit that no such supposed errors were
advanced by the plaintiff either in the reeord on appeal,
or covered by the points argued on appeal, or presented
to the trial court for its determination by motion for a
ne\Y trial prior to appeal, and were, therefore, not properly before this Court for its detennination on appeal.
The following points are respectfully submitted in
support of a rehearing:

POINT I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
JURY WERE CORRE.CT STATEMENTS OF THE LAW IN
THE POINTS AT ISSUE.

2
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POINT II
THE OPINION ASSUMES THAT THE VALUE FIXED
BY THE WITNESSES UPON THE GRAVEL AREA INCLUDED A PROFl T: WHEREAS THE EVIDENCE OF THE
VALUE OF THE SAND AND GRAVEL WAS BASED UPON
WORTH IN PLACE AND NOT UPON RESALE VALUE OF
THE REMOVED GRAVEL. THE METHOD OF VALUATION
USED BY THE WITNESSES IS SUPPORTED BY OPINION
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS IN THREE
DIFFERENT CIRCUITS.
POINT III
THE JURY'S VERDICT CAN BE CONSTRUED AS
AWARDING ONLY ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE VALUE OF
SAND AND GRAVEL PLACED BY THE WITNESSES;
THEREBY LEAVING OVER ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND ($118,000.00) DOLLARS "PROFIT" FOR A PURCHASER.
POINT IV
THE OPINION FAILS TO GIVE PROPER .CONSIDERATION TO THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY.
POINT V
RESPONDENT'S CASE IS SIMILAR TO AND SUPPORTED BY FAMOUS NEW YORK CASE, CITED BY
ORGEL BEFORE FINAL DECISION UPON FINAL APPEAL.
POINT VI
CASES CITED IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT ARE
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM FACTS OF THE INSTANT
CASE.
POINT VII
THE APPELLANT HAVING FAILED TO OBJECT TO
EVIDENCE OR INSTRUCTIONS PERTAINING TO THE
SAND & GRAVEL AT TRIAL, THE APPELLATE COURT
SHOULD NOT CONBIDER OBJECTIONS RAISED FOR
FIRST TIME UPON APPEAL.

3
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POINT VIII
RESPONDENTS RESPECTFULLY REQUEST INFORMA'riON UPON INQUIRIES.
POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED A MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL AND ENTERED JUDGMENT UPON THE VERDICT.

ARGl'.\1ENT
POINT I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
JURY WERE CORRECT STATEMENTS OF THE LAW IN
THE POINTS AT ISSUE.

The trial court directed the jury as follows:

lndruction X o. 7. "lou are not to consider
what the property ·was worth to the defendants
for speculation, or Inerely for possible uses, nor
what they claim it \\~as worth to them, nor can you
consider what it 1nay be worth to plaintiff for
highway purposes, nor what the property would
bring at a forced sale, you ·are not to consider the
price the property would sell for under special or
extraordinary circumstances, but only its fair
market value on July ~:2, 1955, if offered in the
1narket under ordinary eircun1stanees for c-ash,
a reasonable time being given to 1nake the sale."
lnstructiou So. 10. ··~\s to the meaning of
.. .:\[ arket Yalue," the 1narket Yalue of property
taken for public- use is the price esti1nated in terms
of money which the property would bring if offered for sale in the open 1narket with a reasonable ti1ne allowed in which to find a purchaser,
buying with the knowledge of all the uses and
purposes to whic-h jt was adapted .and for which
it was capable; or as otherwise stated, it is the
price the property will bring when offered for sale
4
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by one who desires, but is not required, to sell,
and is sought by one who has the cash, and who
desires, but is not required, to buy, after due consideration of all the elements reasonably affecting
value.''

lnstrnction No. 20. "The defendants were
entitled to sell the land and buildings on the
theory that said land could be used for the best
and most profitable purpose or purposes, for
which it was adapted. They could have sold it on
the theory that it w.as usable for several purposes,
but you nmst consider or assume that the entire
tract of land, including the frontage, trailer
courts, antique store, and sand and gravel deposits, would have sold to one man for whatever
use or uses he could make of it.
''You may not consider uncertain, remote or
speculative, or imaginary uses, but only those
elements which give the property a market value,
or which reduce its market value. One wa~- to do
it would be to suppose a sale by a \villing seller
to a willing buyer, neither one being forced into
the transaction, the buyer having the money to
huy, and then detennine what he would have paid
for it in the light of all of the evidence in this
case.''
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS CONFORMED WITH THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS.

1. 1t fixed th~ use and value of the propert~- for
business purposes, as of the date 0f occupaney h~- the
Stat€'.
~It fixed the value of the buildings in plaee .as of
said date.

5
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3. It fixed the amount of sand and gravel in the
gravel pit of said property and the value of the same
in place as of the date of occupancy.
THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT
PRESUPPOSE THAT THE PURCHASER WOULD "REQUIRE MANY YEARS IN DISPOSING OF THE SAND AND
GRAVEL TO RECOVER BACK THE FULL ESTIMATED
PURCHASE PRICE IF IT 'WERE RECOVERABLE AT ALL''
AS YOUR HONORABLE BODY DECLARED.
POINT II
THE OPINION ASSUMES THAT THE VALUE FIXED
BY THE WITNESSES UPON THE GRAVEL AREA INCLUDED A PROFIT: WHEREAS THE EVIDENCE OF THE
VALUE OF THE SAND AND GRAVEL WAS BASED UPON
WORTH IN PLA·CE AND NOT UPON RESALE VALUE OF
THE REMOVED GRAVEL. THE METHOD OF VALUATION
USED BY THE WITNESSES IS SUPPORTED BY OPINION
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS IN THREE
DIFFERENT CIRCUITS.

\Ve respectfully cite to the court the case of N atioMl
Brick Co. v. United States, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 3~9. 131
F. 2d 30 which ·was quoted in part in respondent's brief,
but is set forth here in its entirety:
131 Federal Reporter, 2nd Series
NATIONAL BRICK CO vs. "CXITED STATES
Xo. 8047
United States Court of App€als for the
District of Columbia
Argued Oct. 5, 1942
Decided Oct. 26, 1942
l~Ininent D01nain 202- ( 4), 252 ( 5)
In proceeding to conden1n said land owned
by brick c01npany, rejection of testimony of company's manager and one engaged in business of

1.

6
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buying and selling sand as to value of land for
sand contained therein was harmful error requiring reversal of judgment on jury's a\v.ard of
lesser amount, especially in view of judge's statement limiting appraisal to value of land as real
estate, though subsequent witness testified as to
value of land .as sand bank.
2.

:f:1~minent

Domain

134

In proceeding to condemn land, special value
thereof due to its adaptability for use in particular business is an element which owner is entitled
to have considered in determining amount to be
paid in just compensation thereof.
3.

Eminent Domain

202(4)

In proceeding to condemn said land owned by
brick cornpany, testimony as to quantity and quality of sand and its value in its natural condition
in bank at time of taking was .admissible to enable
jury to apply correct standard of value of land
with regard to best use thereof.

+.

Eminent Domain

202(4)

In proceeding to condemn sand land owned
by company using sand in manufacturing bricks
or selling it to contractors for making of building
mortar, inquiry should have been whether property was valuable in open market for sale of sand
or use thereof in making bricks, and jury should
have been informed by competent witnes.-;ps engaged in sand business as to quantity and quality
of sand, uses to which it might be put, existence of
market therefor, and value of land with sand on
such market in its then condition.
Appeal fron1 the District Court of the United
States for the District of Columbia.
7
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Proceeding by the United States to condemn
land owned by the National Brick Company. From
a judgrnent on a jury's award of compensation,
the landowner appeals.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
~fessrs. Edwin C. Dutton and Richard E.
\Vellford, both of \Yashington, D.C. for appellant.

:.Mr. J·ohn P. I-Iearne, of the Bar of the state
of ralifornia, pro hac vice, by special leave of
Court with whom Norman l\L Littell, Assistant
Attorney General and "J[essrs. Yernon L. \Vilkinson and Alexander 1-I. Bell, Jr., all of \Y ashington,
D.C. were on brief, for appellee. -:\Iessrs. Charles
R. Denny, Jr., and Dwight H. Doty, both of Washington, D.C. entered appearances for the Appellee.
Before GRO:\T~R, Chief Justice, and :MILLER and YIXSOX, Associate Justices.
GHOXER, C. J.
This is an appeal by a landowner in a condemnation proceeding instituted b~T the rnited
States to acquire lands for the ro.ad development
program of the X ational Capital Parks, Parkway
and Playground ~ystem. The property inYolved
consists of two and a half acres of a thirty-one
acre tract of land adjoining the Baltirnore & Ohio
Railroad right of way in the District of Columbia.
Appellant aequired the tract .about thirty years
ago and constructed on a part of it a plant for
making brick. The plant ha~ been in operation
continnonsl~-. and during the entire thirty years
brick and s.and haYe been sold to builder~ in the
District of Colun1bia and Yicinity. Of the acreage
of the entire tract about one-fifth is denon1inated
''sand land,'' and the particular two and a half
.acre's taken hy the United States is a solid sand
8
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bank sloping frmn a height of forty to ninety feet
above the level of the adjoining railroad tracks.
The bank contains approximately 300,000 cubic
yards of sand, weighing approxirnately 450,000
tons. Appellant valued the land taken at $67,500.
The jury awarded $9,000.
(1) The record does not include the pleadings and the evidence is condensed to a degree
that makes it difficult to determine precisely what
occurred at the trial, but enough appears, we
think, to show that error was committed by the
Court in the rejection of material evidence.
At the trial _Jf r Dalley, a part owner of the
property and manager of the Brick Company
testified that the most valuable use to which the
two and one-half acres proposed to be taken could
be put w.as the manufacture of brick and the sale
of sand to contractors for making building mortar, that the property adjacent to it had been so
used during the past thirty years, and that the
sale of sand was on a per ton basis, appellant
either rnaking delivery at building operations in
the District of Colurnbia, or permitting the purchaser to remove the same from the hank into
his own trucks.
He testified "that the value of the land for
the sand contained therein was $67,500, "which
testimony, on motion of the United States, was
stricken out, because he has estimated the value
by the value of the sand per ton.''
Another \vitness, vVilliam Ohrey Steel, who
is engaged in the District of Columbia in the business of selling sand and operating a sand pit, was
asked to testify to the value of the sand per ton
"in the bank just as it is now." On objection by
the United. States, the Court refused to allow the
9
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witness to answer. Again, he was asked "Have
you bought sand of the same quality as the sand
contained in this two and a half acres?" He answered that he had. lie was then asked what he
had paid for it. An objeotion to this question was
sustained, whereupon a colloquy among counsel
and the Court ensued, during the cour.se of which
the judge remarked to counsel for the landowner: "You are entitled to get the fair market
value of your property for land as real estate.
That is what you are entitled to. You are trying
to get most everything but that."
The same witness was thereupon asked
whether, in view of his experience with "sand
land'' and in the purchase of sand, he wa.s in a
position to state what the fair Inarket value of
this particular land was at the present time. This
question too, the Court refused to allow to be
answered, stating to counsel: "He (the witness)
i.s not the owner. The owner can testify to this
opinion of its value, but he isn't a real estate man.
You know that just as well as I do."
It is quite true that a subsequent ,,..-Jtness was
permitted to answer most of these que.stions .and
to testify that the property as a sand bank was
worth $25,000 or $30,000 an acre. But in spite
of this, we think sufficient harm had been done by
the rejection of proper evidence of value, coupled
with the Judge's statement limiting the appraisal
to the value .as real estate, to leave the jury bewildered as to the proper elements to be taken
into consideration in ascertaining the fair Inarket
value of the property.
Obviously, the Court was originally of opinion that the presence on the property of the sand
bank forty to ninety feet high, containing 300,000

10
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cubic yards of pure sand w:as of no consequence
in determining the value of the property taken,
and that the added value hy reason of the presence of the sand should not be considered. On
this theory most of the evidence of the additional
value of the sand in the bank as it was .and of the
additional value of the property hy reason of
presence of the sand was rejected.
(2) This opinion of the Court was, of course,
wrong, for no rule is better established than that
the special value of land due to its adaptability
for use in a particular business is an element
which the owner of land is entitled to have considered in determining the amount to be paid in
just compensation
So much as this was said by the Supreme
Court in Mitchell v. rnited States, 267 l'.S. 341,
45 S. Ct. 293, 69 L. Ed. 644. And we know of no
other evidence hy which the jury could be properly guided in determining the value of the propert~
than to be told the per ton value of the property
than to be told the sand as it lay, or, without this
knowledge, how the jury could have reached a
judgment based on anything more than guess or
speculation.
(3) Counsel for appellant was not seeking
to prove the profit derived from the sale of the
sand, or the value or price of the sand after it
had been taken out of the bank In questioning
these witnesses he was seeking to show the vahw
of the land with regard to the bes~t use that could
be made of it. This is the standard hy \vhich the
jury was to n1ake an award. In order that they
might apply this standard it was necessary that
they know the quantity and quality of the sand
and its value at the time of taking in its natural
11
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condition in the bank. Counsel's que.stions wer.e
confined to these issues. :\Iontana Ry. Co. v.
\Varren, 137 U.S. 348, 11 S. Ct. 96, 34 L. Ed. 681.
See, also, :Manning v. City of Lowell, 173 Mass.
100, 53 N.E. 160; Creighton v. Board of Com'rs.
143 N.C. 171, 55 S.E. 511, 10 Ann. Cas. 218; Savings & Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 229 Pa.
484, 78 A. 131.
In the leading case of Boom Co. v. P.atter.son,
98 U.S. 403, 408, 25 L. Ed. 206, the Court held that
the adaptability of lands located in the Mississippi
• River for a logging boom ·was a proper element in
estimating their value. It was there said: "So
many and v.aried are the circu1nstances to be
taken into account in determining the value of
property condemned for public purposes, that it
is perhaps impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will rnodify the most carefully guarded rule; but, .as a general thing, we 8hould say
that the compensation to the owner is to be estirnated by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the cmnmunity, or such a~ may
be reasonably expected in the immediate future."
What is already said receives .additional emphasis from the fact that the Governrnent's ·witnesses in this case \Yere real estate rnen \Yho testified in the n1ain in rPlation to the value of the
land for real estate developrnent and who, when
asked about the added value of the sand bank
treated it as an encurnbranee which w. ould have
to be removed for building operations rather than
as an added value to the land.
James \Y. Campbell, the single witne:;;s of the
Governrnent who was in the sand business, eon-

12
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fined himself on the subject of value to the statement that he had .a ten years' supply of sand on
hand and for that reason he had not inquired as
to other sources of sand supply or their value.
But he and the other witnesses for the Government were permitted to state what in their opinion was the value of the land for real estate development purposes alone.
( 4) We think the inquiry should have been
whether the property was valuable in the open
marke1t for the sale of sand or for the use of sand
in the making of bricks, and that in order to re.aeh
a fair conclusion in this respect the jury should
have been informed hy competent witnesses as to
the quantity of the sand, the quality of the sand,
the uses to which it might be put, whether there
was a market for it, and the value of the land with
the sand in that market in its then condition.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
The testimony of :Mr. Schoenfeld (R 217-239) as
smwnarized in the Respondent's Brief at page 5 and 6
shows that in fixing the value of the sand and gravel at
25c and 1Oc per ton respectively, the witness considered
the value of the sand and gravel as it lay in place; that
the fine sand conld be delivered for sale .at 90c per ton
after payment of costs of loading and hauling of 35c pPr
ton lea,ving a gTo:-;s profit of 55c per ton. In the interest
of hreYity, the attention of the court is respectfully invited to the citations in the Respondent's Brief, and the
record for the testimony of Mr. Schoenfeld in connection
with the value of the material together with the great
demand and market for the material, espeeiall~· hy rea-

13
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son of the proximity of the Noble property to the market
for said products. The jury had the benefit of :\f r.
Schoenfeld's testimony both on direct and cross examination concerning costs and profit and were fully advised
that the value established by Mr. Schoenfeld for the
products in place included no profit.
The opinion indicates some concern with the staternent of ).fr. ~ oble that it may have taken him 15 years
to sell the 1nuck sand. \Ye respectfully submit that a
"willing buyer" would fair better selling the sand over
a 15 year period, because of the greater advantage incmne tax "\vise, and in view of the nearness of this
property to the growing market, when according to the
testi1nony, the location of the X oble property with respeet to the market and dernand results in a saving immediately of from 35c to $1.00 per ton hauling costs
from the next nearest sources. The "'willing buyer" is
also apprised that there is only one crop of sand and
gravel; that the largest operator in the area, Utah Sand
& Gravel has already depleted its supply in that vicinity;
that of all cornmodities which 1nay be rendered obsolete,
sand and gravel would seern to be one of the last minerals
to fall from the rnarket and that the passage of tin1e in
the face of a din1inishing supply would serve to advance
the value of the sand and gravel.
POINT III
THE JURY'S VERDICT CAN BE CONSTRUED AS
AWARDING ONLY ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE VALUE OF
SAND AND GRAVEL PLACED BY THE WITNESSES;
THEREBY LEAVING OVER ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND ($118,000.00) DOLLARS "PROFIT" FOR A PUR-
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CHASER.

The jury had testimony of the Respondent's witness
supporting the verdict as follows:
Frontage, 595 feet at each $75.00 ________ $ 44,625.00
Improvements ------------------------------- _________ 40,999.00

85,624.00
Sand and Gravel area -------------------------- 183,269.10
$268,893.10
The jury, by finding the whole tract to be worth
$150,000.00, in effect, may have assigned only $64,376.00
to the sand and gravel computed as follows:
Total value ----------------------------------------------$150,000.00
Frontage and improvements ______________ 85,624.00
Yalue of sand .and gravel area____________ 64,376.00
The value assigned to the gravel area by the jury
was about one-third of that testified to by the Respondent':;; witnesses, which left a margin for a prospective
buyer of $118,893.10, based upon value in place. The
value of the sand and gravel area if based upon retail
or incidental sales after re1noval was much greater as
te~tified by Mr. Schoenfeld.
POINT IV
THE OPINION FAILS TO GIVE PROPER ·CONSIDERATION TO THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY.

The trial of this cause continued for a period of
about -:P/~ days during which time the jury considered
testimony as set forth in over 400 pages of record, and
viewed the premises which then consisted mainly of the
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debris of the removed buildings .and the gravel area.
The jury could find it quite significant that both the
witnesses for the Appellant and Respondent used similar
methods by which to arrive at a market value in that
these witnesses from the business world would be pursuing the subject the same as the prospective purchaser,
who, hirnself would know no other way of determining
the value of the land. If, in fact, the witnesses did misconceive the method by which the value of the gravel
area was to be determined, the jury, by its reduced verdict cannot, itself, be deemed to have arrived at its verdict other than in the proper manner.
The finding of the jury that the whole of the X oble
property was worth $150,000.00 is consistent with the
proposition that the jury only consider quality, quantity,
and price of the sand in arriving at the value of the land
with the sand in it. There is no indication that the jury
1nuJtiplied quantity of sand by price per ton in arriving
at its verdict.
This court has on many occasions expressed itself
on the regard to be given to the verdict of the trier of
fact:
:~G~,

In the case of vVilson YS. rlroid, 1 rtah Second,
2G7 P ~d 759, the court held:
( 5) ''The que~tion of dmnages in such instance seems best addre~sPd to the discretion of a
jur~·; they haYe hmues, spouses and children of
their own, are experienced in the practical affairs
of daily life, and lwYe different points of Yiew:
and they are afforded the benefit of seeing and
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hearing the parties and their witnesses. Because
of their advantaged position courts are extremely
reluctant to interfere with their verdicts. This
is necessarily so in order that the right of trial
by jury assured under our law9 be preserved. If
courts were prone to set aside jury verdicts and
substitute their own judgments therefor whenever they disagreed with the jun·, the right would
be abrogated and the jury s~·stem would be but
a pretense. The concept of trial h~' jury necessarily presupposes that there is a wide area within which the pendulum of the jury's deliberations
may swing without interference from the court.
And ~o long as they remain within the boundaries
of what reasonable minds could believe their
findings should remain inviolate.
(7) "The validity of the verdict in the instant case is reinforced hy the fact that the trial
judge has given his approval hy refusing to vacate or modify it. As we stated in Geary v.
Cain, 11 ' • • • in case of doubt, the deliberate action
of the trial court should prevail. Otherwise thi~
court will sooner or later find itself usurping the
functions of both the jtu~, and the trial court, .. ' "
X asner Y. Burton et al, 2 Ftah 2d 236, 272 P. 2d 163
held "This being a law case and Plaintiff having prevailed, h(~ i:;; entitled to the benefit of the evidence in
the light most favorable to him, together with every
inferenee and intendment fairly and reasonably arising
therefrom."
.John C. Cutler Association v. De.Jay Ston·~, 3 l'tah
2d 107 270 P. 2d 700, the court held: "The defendant,
De;ht~·, having prevailed is entitled to have us view the
evidence .and every fair inference and intendment arising
therefrom in the light most favorable to it. And if when
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so regarded, there is any substantial evidence, or, as
sometimes stated, any reasonable basis in the evidence
to support the finding made by the trial court, it will not
be disturbed."
Bowden v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P. 2d 240:
'~There is a most important difference between this case and the Butz case hereinabove discussed. In the latter, the trial court had deprived
the plaintiff of a trial by jury and resolved all
of the j ssues of fact against him as a matter of
law, whereas in this case the 1natter was submitted to a jury .and the facts were found against
the plaintiff. "\\-r e reaffirm our eomrnitJnent that
a_rhe right of jury trial ... is ... a right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen . . . (that it)
should be jealously guarded by the courts.~·' But
once having been granted such right and a verdict rendered, it should not be regarded lightly
nor overturned '"-ithout good and sufficient reason; nor should a judgment be disturbed merely
because of error. Only when there is error both
substantial and prejudicial, and when there is
a reasonable likelihood that the re.sult would
have been different without it, should error be
regarded as sufficient to upset a judgment or
grant a new trial."

Taylor

Y.

\Yeber County, -! rtah 2d

3:2~.

293 P. 2d.

925:
"'This being a law action and the jury having
found the issues in f.avor of the defendant, they
are entitled to have us consider all the evidence,
and every inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the
defendant.
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"The evidence as revealed by the record is
conflicting, but was found under the courts instructions to · be clear and s.atisfactory in the
defendants favor. The jury saw and heard all of
the ·witnesses, viewed the premises, and examined
the exhibits. Since the evidence amply sustains
the verdict, we are not disposed to overturn it
unless it -vvas rendered under instruction, constituting prejudicial error."
Has the respondent been accorded the benefit of the
evidence .and every fair inference and intendment arising
therefrom in the light most favorable to the respondent J
In addition to the evidence summarized in the briefs, and
in this petition, we respectfull,,- urge the court's consideration of the following excerpts from the testimony
which indicate that the jury was not acting under any
misconception of fact or la \\' in arriving at its verdict.
~1R. NOBLT~:

Q.

(H. 170)

T still do not get an answer to m:: question,

:\Jr. N able. I want to know how you got the
$200,000.00 figure value on your gravel.
_\. \Vell, in the first place, I could take it out
1nyself and get a lot more out of it than that.
Q. T am not interested in that.
A. I could sell all my gravel 1 could get, considerably more than that-worth consjderabl,\T
more than that. (169).
Q. How long would it take :-ou to sell that at
24,000 tons a year ~
A. Well, I don't know, l would have to figure a
little bit.
Q. It would take quite a while, wouldn't :·ou?
A. I don't know. 1 would have to sell it that "·ay.
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Q.

A.

How fast could YOU sell it'?
I do not know, 'that depends on the market.
I wouldn't have to be in an,\~ hurry if I owned
the land.

::\f r.

Sdto(·nfeld, after testifying that the fine sand
was worth 25e per ton jn place and the gravel worth lOc
per ton in plaee (It 222), and that the proxi1nity of the
N ohle property to the Salt Lake market results in a saving~ of fron1 :2;)r to 30c a ton hauling costs if the material
had to be hauled frmu Bountiful, the next nearest source,
(R. 2:2;)) and that he rdails the sarid at 90c per ton at
Salt Lake Cit~·, (H. 226), then under cross examination
gave answers to questions as follows:
BY

~IH.

BUDGE:
Q. ~r r. Schoenfeld, let's get thi~ figured no,v. \Ye
are starting out with a figure of 90 cents, you
say :23 to haul it, that leayes 65 cents. You
say it costs 10 rent:-; to load it, that leaYes 55
cents. X ow I an1 interested in how much does
the rrtaterial cost: what do you pay for the
1naterial?
A. \\Thieh I stated there, I would pay :25 cents a
ton.
Q. Are you leasing presently, ).f r. Schoenfeldare you leasing property presently?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. .\n) you pa:·inu: ~;) cents a ton. in place, for
~~our 1naterial?
A. No, I am not.
Q. \\~hat are you paying?
A. 10 cents-I run pa~-ing 10 cents.
Q. But you would be willing to pay :23 cents. is
that right?
A. For that 1nuck sand. yes.
20
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Q. You are not paying 25 cents now, though, you
are paying 10 cents 1
A. I havenjt got .any muck sand. It isn't cleaned
off, if there was any. I an1 taking a virgin
mountain, and have to do all of the exploring.
Q. That's right, absolutely right, and you know
under the terms of your le,ase, you pay so
1nuch .a yard for the material removed; now
have you agreed to pay 25 cents for muck
sand, if there is any there, and you remove
it; have you 1
A. I would on thatQ. I did not ask you that. I said under your
present lease you are paying 10 cents.
A. Paying 10 cents for s.and and gravel.
Q. \Vhether sand or gravel, you are going to get
it for 10 cents?
A. For ten cents.
Q. That is what I want to know. I don't want
any evasion here. I want this jury to know
what the true facts .are.
So now we can take that 10 cents off the
55 cents; that leaves you 45 cents. That would
be a profit-is that what you are telling us 1
A. That's right.
Q. And you would not have any bu.siness overhead connected with it~
.:-\. All you would have is your bookkeeping.
Q.
A.

A bookkeeper; that is something, isn't it'!
That would cost you something wouldn't it?
Yes, that would cost something.

Q.
A.

Is there any other
No.

Q.
A.

You don't have to carry insurance ?
That's right, hiring it done.

expense~
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
· A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

All right, you don't have insurance. Do you
have any equip1nent at all~
You don't if you hired it done.
How do you ge~t it loaded?
You can get it loaded for 10 cents a ton, as
I told you. They will load it for 10 cents a
ton all over the country.
You don't take into consideration any equiprnent of any kind then, at all, and no other
expenses than that.
I can't see where there would be, no.
.How about w.ages; wages would c01ne out of
your profits?
Which would be a very good profit.
I-Iow 1nuch muck sand could you load all by
yourself out of one of those pits and make
45 cents a ton on it?
Well, we have tested that out, with a tractor.
loading 200 tons, an hour.
I thought you did not have equip1nent now!
I am stating this: I hired it done.
vVe .are trying to find out where the -t3 cents
goes ; how much is profit.
\ Ve load 200 tons.
How many n1en do you have to load 200 tons
an hour?
One n1an.
One 1nan, no loading machine; how do you get
it up in the trucks 1
vVith that loading traetor. with that piece of
equipment.
That costs sOinething don't it: how n1uch did
that tr:actor cost ?
$18,000.
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Q. $18,000; then somebody has got to be paid for
that, don't they, out of the· profit~
A. I can hire it loaded and let mine set, and get
it unloaded for 10 cents. Therefore, the cost
wouldn't be any more if I loaded it myself
than if I hire it loaded.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

You wouldn't even have to go out there at all;
you can stay home and get thatf
That's right, I could.
You would not even have to keep track of how
much they took out 1
~ o, the ticket machine would tell me.

~Ir. Hi<leont ( !{. ~S~)) to (R. ~87) expressed his
opinion that tlw market value of the property based
upon the idea that fair market value of the property is
\Vhat a ·willing lmyer \vho had the me.ans to do so, and
,,·ho \\·a~n 't under pre:-;~nre, \Vould pay to a willing seller,
\\·ho desired to :-;ell his property and wasn't under pres:'Ure to sell it. ~lr. Rideout based his opinion in part upon
the expert opinion of others. As to this method of arriving at an opinion, \Yhigmore has this to say. "There is
no mysterious logical fatality in basing 'one expert opinion upon another.'; it is done every day and business and
applied seienre." ( :inl lDd. Supplement adds) : "For that
matter, in ~·very day trials factual opinions or conclu~ion~ of both lay and expert witnesses are utilized in
hypothetical questions." (1 \\~higmore Evidence 2d Ed.
Sec. 682, p. 1093).

\Vhigmore, 3d Ed. Vol. III, Sec. 720, after stating
that knowledge of the thing to be valued is a requirement
~ays
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"As with other kinds of knowledge (Ante Sec.
672) so with knowledge of values, the place of this
element rnay be supplied by hypothetical question.
Thus, where a witness is competent to speak of
house values, but has not seen the house in question, the specifications and other particulars may
be placed before him hypothetically for an opinion, and then his knowledge of the value-standard
may become available; or in some cases, his attention may be called to .a thing assun1ed to be
substantially similar to that in question and his
judgn1ent may be given on the hypothesis of similarity, this hypothetical basis is legitimately and
frequently employed as a substitute for actual
observ.a tion."
~Ir.

J(iepe (H. 389)

Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

"A.

And what were your findings-do you have
an opinion as to the value of fine sand, n1uck
sand and blending sand, or do you have an
opinion as to the value of that~
I have an opinion as to what the materials,
which are "'ithin that area excavation would
be worth.
You obtained that frmn, I suppose also, sales
of cmnparable 1naterial in the .area: that went
into your consideration f
Yes, the prices sand and g-raYel n1en are paying for 1naterials in place.
\Vhat do you think is a fair 1narket price for
1nuck s.and and 1nixing sand or blending sand,
in place~
rrhe price I put on this 1naterial, was at the
rate of ten cents a cubic yard.
Ten cents a cubic yard-what price did you
put on the graye], l\fr. ICiepe?
That is all of that.
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Q. You say 10 cents 1
A. Overburden, sand and gravel, all materials
lying above the level of the highway, I have
given an average price of ten cents.
Q. In place, ten cents~
A. Yes.
~r r. Solomon (R. 481) :
Q. \Vhat do yon find to be the fair market price
for these materials as of that date, as you
have determined~
A. Front my investigation, in my opinion, that
1nuck sand is worth 10 cents per cubic yard, in
place, and overburden, 4 cents per cubic yard,
in place.
Q. And did you check at various locations, and
upon various instru1nents to figure those
uses~

A.

I checked with operators who were buying
and selling such products, .also with the market.
POINT V

RESPONDENT'S CASE IS SIMILAR TO AND SUPPORTED BY FAMOUS NEW YORK CASE, CITED BY
ORGEL BEFORE FINAL DECISION UPON FINAL APPEAL.

The opinion quotes from Orgel on ....raluation rnder
Eminent Domain," 4th Addition, page~ 541 to ;)47. It is
to be noted that the Pntire quotation from Orgel is taken
under the chapter titled ''Bu~inP~s Profits" as EYidence
of Yalue." Orgel and tlw opinion C'iti· two X<'w York
cases, Orleans County Query Co. v. ~tat<>, 17:2 App. Div.
868, 159 K.Y.~. 30 (1916), and Sparkhill Realty Corp. v.
State, 268 K.Y. 192, 197, N.E. 1~J~ (1935). The Stl(lrklii11
Realty Corp. 1:. Strtte case was litigated over a period of
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about 10 years and w.as finally concluded by an opinion
rendered April 27, 1938 by the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, of N e·w York, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 679, which opinion
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New York, 279
N.Y. 656, 18 N.E. 2d 301. The property comprised about
16-1 acres of which 110 acres were upland containing deposits of Trap rock and the remaining 54 acres were
1narsh lands. The first award was for $1,650,000.00; upon retrial there wa_s an identical award. The third award,
based upon a referee's report to the lower court was
$1,333,209.00, together with interest of $630,830.00. The
previous judg1nents had been reversed and remanded for
new trial for the reason that the value was established
by expert witnesses who based their opinions upon the
anticipated profits to be derived from the operation
of a quarry which had not yet been placed into operation. \Ve quote now certain excerpts from the opinion
of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in 1938,
4 K.Y.S. 2d 679:
·•That judg1nent under review should not be
disturbed unless it clearly appears that it included
unlawful, or excluded lawful, ele1nents of damage,
or unless it is tainted \\-ith un1nistakable legal
error.. The value of property taken in eondenmation proceedings i~ a question of fact (case cited).
It is settled he)·ond question that respondents
.are entitled to reeoYer the fair 1narket value of
their property based on the most advantageous
use to which it eould be put. In thi~ ca~e appellant
occupies the status of a purchaser ~cases eited).
In order to arrive at an esti1nate of fair 1narket
'~alue of the property in question, all those things
which would be eonsidered by a buyer and seller,
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neither under compulsion, neither having an advantage over the other, 1nust be taken into consideration by a witness competent to assemble,
weigh and translate them into dollars and cents.
All the facts and circumstances which a buver and
seller would consider in connection with the purehase and sale of a piece of property are relevant
and material in arriving at a detennination as to
it:;; market value. Exceptional circumstances exist
in this case. The property which is the subject of
this litigation -- a quarry and an uncompleted
plant-is not the subject of barter and sale in
any general market and obviously its value is not
to be determined upon evidence relevant in eases
involving residc>n('e, business or similar propert~·.
B....,air value in this instance, neither being under
duress, is the sum of money a willing purchaser
of such a plant and quarry \v·ould p.ay, and a willing seller would accept. \Vhen the state deprives
a citizen of his property for publie use, he should
have the right to prove every element that ean
fairly enter into the question of market value
(eases cited) * * * The respondents swore three
expert witnesses on the question of value. To diseuss the evidence in detail would extend our views
beyond reasonable limits. We shall therefor, but
briefly refer to the testimony. In respon.se to a
hypothetical question, one of these witnesses fixed
the value of the respondent's property at the time
of appropriation at $1,946,528.70; another at $1,996,529.00 and the third at between $1,996,529.00
and $2,496,529. Appellant eritieizes this evidence
and argues that it is based upon concjecture as to
profits and that the data upon which the witnesses relied are speculative and conjectural and
that consequently the responses of the witne.sse.s
ar based upon an assumption of a fixed annual
profit from the quarry operations. \Ve cannot
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acquiesce in this view. Not only did the witnesses
deny that they took such an element into consideration, but the question propounded to them
speeifically excluded such an assun1ption. \Y e
agree with the referee that the hypothetical question was free fron1 the objections condemned by
the court of appeals in the former appeal. As
said by him, it •included no element of good will
and no assumption that the operation of this
property would produce certain profits during the
period of many years.' Respondent's "·itnesses
did take into consideration, and they ·were justified in so doing, the value of the trap rock and
the profitable operation of the plant. Certainly
a prospective purchaser and a seller would have
in 1nind a possibility of profit to be derived from
the operation of the plant. It was not an assumption of profitable operation, but an assu1nption
of fixed profit oyer a period of years which the
Court of .Appeals rejected. X owhere in the opinion of .Judge Loughran is there any intimation
that the court intended to exclude from consideration the possibility of profitable operation. The
condmnnation of the fonner judg1nent in the highest court \Yas based not upon a profit but upon an
invariable profit oYer 'decades to con1e' * * *
"In e1ninent dmnain proceedings, one who is
deprived of his property should he pennitted to
prove all factors which are rele,.,.ant in fixing its
value. There i~ no well considered case which
holds that profib 1nay neYer be considered as an
as an element of value. Profits nwy be reeognized
as an in1portant item, and are only excluded in
eaf'f's "~here the evidence is too speculative. Each
easp 1H'ee~saril~- inYolYes different facts and n1ust
be considered by itself. Only a few general rules
appl~· on the question of valuation in conde1nna28
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1
j

tion proceedings, and even these Inay yield to
exceptional circu1nstances (cases cited). The usable value of property for any suitable legitimate
business is always relevant in fixing its market
value (cases cited). But it is the potentialities
of .a given piece of property, both develped and
undeveloped which constitute its chief element of
value. The value of trap rock and the reasonable
probabilities of the profit to be derived therefrom
are elements which may be assumed a prospective
purchaser would take into account in fixing the
value which he would be willing to give for the
property * * *."
The court indicated that the fact that the owner
purchased the property in 1909 for $18,000.00, was unimpressive for the reason that "no plans had been perfected for turning this barren land into a trap rock
quarry whereby its value might be greatly increased, in
1909 * * *"
\Ye respectfully submit that the final determination
of the cause in thP 8JNlrki11 Realty Corp v. State case
could well change the views of Orgel and the Orleans
case. HO\n•ver, in citing the Spwrkhill case, we do not
mean to concede that the element of the profit was considered in any re~ 1)f'd in establishing the market value
of the Jn·opert~,, since, in fact, the element of profit was
specifically Pxduderl.
POINT VI
CASES CITED IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT ARE
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM FACTS Oli' THE INSTANT
CASE.

In the case of Searle z:. tlw

J.~ackrnranJHl

& Blooms-
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burg Railroad Company, 33 Pennsylvania, page 57, cited
in the opinion and quoted by Nichols on page 248, this is
a case in 1857, wherein the railroad was condemning
lands which ran acros.s unopened and undeveloped coal
1nines, and the court indicated that these undeveloped
coal lands were commonly sold by the acre. The follo·wing
excerpts are significant:
"But so far as regards the unopened coal
veins on the land, \Ve may treat the case as one of
wild lands ... "
''In relation to the wild lands, such operations
are no present injury, except in a purely imaginary sense. * * * '~
The case of Reifer v. State Highu·ay Conun·ission,
177 K. 683, 281 P. 2d 1080, is a case wherein the court
cites Federal District Court cases in support of its decision. The Federal District Court case cited were the
r:nited States 1"·· Indian Creek Jiarble Co., 40 Federal
Bupple1nent 81 l and Cnited States ·z:. Fire Acres of Land,
50 Federal Supplement 69. The Indian Creek l\[arble
ease as heretofore noted was merely a memorandum by
the District Judge in advising commissioners on n1ethods·
of establishing valuation.
rrhe Heiter case differs frmn the instant case in
the follovling p.articulars:
a. In the Reiter case, the Highway Connnission
n1ade timely objection to the testimony of the witneS:Ses
as to the value of the land based upon the sand and gravel,
which objections were overruled by the trial c.ourt.
30
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b. There was no evidence that the sand would ever
be mined or marketed.

c. In the Reiter case, three of the witnesses arrived
at the valuation based upon the quantity of sand under
the land and the price received for the .sand when it w.as
sold. In the instant case, the witnesses for the respondents testified as to the value of the whole land taking
into consideration the existence of the sand and gravel
and the testimony as to the value of the sand and gravel
as it lay in place; in the instant case the jury was apprised 1nany times during trial that they were to find
the value of the land .and not necessarily the va] ue of
the sand; for example, during the testimony of :Mr.
Gaddis, :Jfr. Gaddis in explaining the basis of his appraisal began to indicate a value of the sand and gravel
wherein the court interrupted as follows :

THE COURT:
"Just a moment, that value is what these
witnesses said it was worth in place, but that
doesn't say what you could sell the property for
with that much in place.
A. That is true.
THE COUHT: Your problem is what it would
sell for under the conditions that :Mr. l\faw described of a willing seller and a willing buyer (R.
278) ."
rrhe opinion quotes from Nichols on Eminent Domain from page ~4:3, and the first quotation ends with
the phrase 'value of the land.' Nichols goes on to say
right after that ''If a piece of land contains valuable improvements, those improvements apart from the land
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may not be considered. But certainly the character, nature, .and extent of the improvements and the revenue
derived therefrom are as essential to be considered in
.arriving at the value of the land as the land itself or the
uses to which it may be put."
POINT VII
THE APPELLANT HAVING FAILED TO OBJECT TO
EVIDENCE OR INSTRUCTIONS PERTAINING TO THE
SAND & GRAVEL AT TRIAL, THE APPELLATE COURT
SHOULD NOT CONSIDER OBJECTIONS RAISED FOR
FIRST TI:i.VIE UPON APPEAL.

At the time of trial, the appellant rnade no obiection that tht- respondents were endeavoring to establish
the valne of the land hy n1ultiplying the quantity of sand
by the price per ton. In fact, the appellant santioned the
type of evidence offered by the respondent in that the
appellant's '"itnt·~:-:e~ the1nselves arrived at their opinion of the n1arket value by detern1ining the quantity of
sand and its value in place. If there was any error in
admitting the evidence or if the evidence was in1proper,
the objection being made for the first tune upon appeal
shon1d not be considered by the .appellate court.
In the ca~e of Petti11.r;ill r. Perkins,
:.!7:.! P. :Z(1 1~;·), this court held:

'.:l..'.

~

Ftah 2d 266,

''ln order that a party rnay take advantage
of an error in instructions connnitted bY the trial
court, he rnust rnake a proper objectio~. 53 ~\m.
Jur. P. 606. Generally. appellate eourts will not
review .a ground of objection not urged in the trial
court. 3. An1. J ur. 116, Appeal and Error, 381.
The dnt~· is incurnbent upon c:ounsel to give the
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trial court the opportunity to correct the error before asking the appellate court to reverse a verdict and judgment thereon. Furthermore, it is
well e,stablished that a party cannot assign as
error the giving of his own requests. He cannot
lead the court into error .and then be heard to
complain thereof. To permit such action would
needlessly prolong litigation, so there might never
be an end thereto. Having by his own pleadings,
evidence, and instruction tried and rested the case
upon the theory that the mother's negligenee
would bar the f.ather, he is bound thereby, as the
law of the case. He cannot now on appeal shift
his theory and position.''
POINT VIII
RESPONDENTS RESPECTFULLY REQUEST INFORMATION UPON INQUIRIES.

The respondent re~pt>(·tfully requests the court to
advise respondents upon the following inquiries:
a. The opinion state:-: that "the land must be valued
as land with the sand and gravel given due consideration
as a eomponent part of the land and evidence of the
amount, quality and value of the sand and gravel may be
considered."
\Vould it he proper for the re~pondent to give evidence of the .amount, quality and value of the sand;
then \vithout gi Ying t5pecifie testimony of the market
value of the land, allmv the jury themselves to fix the
market value of the land H('('ording to the instructions
of the court.
b. Is there an~' necessit:~ that witrwi-1:-;t>~ testify as
to the 1narket value of the whole tract or is it sufficient
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that evidence be presented which describes the tract, its
uses, and the value of its component parts, then allow
the jury to fix the overall value.
c. The expert appraisers arrived at their valuations
hy considering the value of the component parts, for
exan1ple, :Jlr. Solomon, (R. -+77 to R. 493) testified that
he arrived at his appraisal hy considering the valuation
of the frontage property for .a depth of 200 feet, by considerartion of the value of the sand and gravel area, and
by consideration of the i1nprovements on the property.
The improve1nents he examined were a laundry room, a
water heater, a repair shop, a brick residence, an antique
shop, meters, sewage disposals and trailer stalls; the
hmne, he found, had a depreciated replacement value of
$10,797.00, the laundry room, $1,920.00, the antique repair shop $1878.00, the antique shop, $3,532.00 and 32
aprons for use for trailer court, $3,200.00, etc. He then
used the aggregate of these values in detennining his
market value. Should there be any difference in arriving
at the value of the land with improvements upon it by
considering the value of the land and the value of the
improvements in arriving at one value for both the land
and improvements, than in detennining the value of land
containing valuable sand and gravel by arriving at the
value of the land by considering the value of the land
and the value of the 1uinerals in it and then detennining
one value for the land with the in1provements.
d. If the opinion of the expert were that the 1narket
value of the land wpre~ in fad. the aggregate value of
ib co1nponent parts, and that this aggreg·ate value were
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$270~000.00,

but the reviewing court did not feel that this
appraisal was supported by the evidence, then how much
less than $270,000.00 would the evidence support.
POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED A MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL AND ENTERED .JUDGMENT UPON THE VERDI·CT.

The plaintiff nwved for a new trial for the reason,
among others, that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict of the jury. The court, after argument
upon the motion denied the motion and entered judgment
upon the jury verdict. This court has repeatedly refused
to grant a new trial where the district court has denied
a motion for new trial.
The rule was stated in James L:. Robertson, 39 Ft.
-tl -±, 117 Pac. 1068, which held in part as follows:
'"vVhile the district court, in the exercise of a
sound legal discretion, without basing his ruling
upon any specific error of law may, under certain
circumstances, possess the authority to grant a
new trial, yet we cannot do so, nor can we exercise
the discretion which the district court might, and
in .some cases perhaps ought to have exercised.
In cases like the one before us, where all other
assignments fail, and the only available assignment is that the evidence does not justify the verdict of the jury, and where the trial court has refused to grant a new trial, all that we are authorized to do is to look into the evidence to ascertain
whether there is any substantial evidence in support of every material element, which plaintiff
is required to establish in order to recover. If
there is such evidence, then, so far a.s we are con-
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cerned, the verdict must stand, although in our
judgrnent if we passed on the facts, the verdict
upon the whole evidence should have been to the
contrary. Nor can we, under the guise of reviewing an abuse of discretion by the trial court in
refusing to grant a new trial upon the ground that
the verdict is not supported by the evidence, pas:s
upon the weight of the evidence. What the district
judge might, or even should have done in this regard we may not do for him, sirnply because he
refused to do it.''
A review of the authorities on this point i.s contained
in the opinion of this court in :Jioser v. Z.C.~I.I., 197 Pac.
2d, 136, wherein it wa~ said:

;.It is a matter now too \vell settled to admit
of any serious dispute (and appellants do not contend otherwise) that the question of granting or
denying a motion for new trial is a rnatter largely
within the discretion of the trial court. \\l1ite \.
1Jnion Pacific Railroad Co., 8 rt. 56, 29 P. 1030;
Yan Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 rt. 606,
161 P. 50; Utah State X ational Bank v. Livingston, 69 rt. 284, 25-t P. 781: Thornpson Y. Brown
Live Stock Co., 7-1: rt. 1, 276 P. 651: Jensen Y.
Logan City, 89 rt. 347, 57 P. 2d. 708. This rule
applies whether the rnotion is based upon insufficiency of the evidence or upon newly discovered
evidenee. See eases above cited and \raliotis v.
l Ttah Apex ~fining· Co., 55 l~t. 131. 1 ~-+ P. so~:
Greco v. Gentile, SS rt. :255. 33 P. :2d 1155: and
rrrirnble Y. llnion Pacific. Stag-e~. 105 rt. -!;)7. 1-t~
P. 2d 67 4. rr'his eourt cannot substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. J ame.s ,.:. Robertson, 39 Ft. 41-!-, 117 P. 1068, :2 X.C.C.~-\. 782. \Ye
do not ordinarilv interfere with ruling·s of the trial
court in Pither granting or denying 'a nwtion for
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new trial, and unless abuse of, or failure to exercise discretion on the part of the trial judge is
quite clearly shown, the ruling of the trial judge
will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Moyle,
et al., 4 Ut. 327, 9 P. 867; White v. Union Pacific
Ry. Co., supra; Utah State National Bank v.
Livingston, and Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages,
supra. ***
''The rule in this jurisdiction, early laid down
by this court, is that where a motion for new trial
is based upon insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdi0t, the trial court will not be held
to have abused its discretion in denying the motion unless there is not substantial evidence in the
record to support the verdict. Fnited States v.
Brown, 6 Ut. 115, 21 P. 461; James v. Robertson,
39 Ut. 414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N.C.C.A. 78:2. Therefore,
if reasonable minds could have found as the ;jury
did in this case, from the evidence before it, then
we cannot say that the trial court abu.sed its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for new trial
on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict."
In concJuding the court said:
"And the jury having determined this question in plaintiff's favor, and the trial court having
denied defendants' motion for new trial, this court
cannot sav that the trial court abused its discretion un]e~s there wa~ no substantial evidence to
support the verdict, or in other words, that all
reasonable minds must agree that it was plaintiff
and not defendant Rogers, who transgressed the
center line of the highway.''
Further, in rptown Appliance & Radio Co., Inc. v.
Flint, et al., 249 Pac. 2d S2G, this court said:
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"Jury trials are a part of the fundamental
tenets of our judicial system .and where, as in this
case a litigant has fully, completely, and without
restraint been permitted to show his full grievance to a jury and they have conscientiously and
without any showing of prejudice or other extraneous influences decided the 1natter there 1nust be
some basic .and compelling reason so inherent in
the evidence that the trial judge ':\.rould be warranted in placing his ;judgn1ent as to the result
to be reached over and above that of the jury.
"'A court, vacating a verdict and granting .a
new trial by merely setting up his opinion or
judgment against the constitutional trial by jury.'
Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company, 44 Ut. 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192."
In the instant c.ase. the plaintiff had

eYer~-

oppor-

tunity to place before the jury all evidence of value of
the property and was permitted on cross exmnination to
disclose in detail how the respondents' witnesses arrived
at their evidence of value. The jury over a period of

41h days had .an opportunity to consider all elements
which go to determining value and appear to have been
fully advised a;;; to the contentions of both the respondent
and appellant on 1natters concerning value. The jury
verdict of $150,000, certainly is supported by evidence
of v;alue and there is no indication that the jury arriYed
at its verdict by any other than a proper fonnula, and it
would see1n that the respondent should at least be entitled
to this inferrence.
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CONCLUSION
Respondents re.spectfully urge the court to reconsider its opinion in the light of giving the respondents
the benefit of ever~~ intendment of the evidence; in eliminating from consideration matter::) raised for the first
time on appeal; in giving due consideration to the findings of the jury and the trial court, and in eliminating
from consideration of so 1nuch of Nichols and Orgel and
other opinions which are based upon minority or superceded law.
Respectfully submitted,

HERBERT B. J\fA \V
W:B~NDELL

B. HAJ\1MOND

GEORGE IL FADEZ
Attorneys for Respondents
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